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Abstract
Here we investigate the extent of children’s understanding of the joint commitments inherent in joint activities. Three-year-
old children either made a joint commitment to assemble a puzzle with a puppet partner, or else the child and puppet each
assembled their own puzzle. Afterwards, children who had made the joint commitment were more likely to stop and wait
for their partner on their way to fetch something, more likely to spontaneously help their partner when needed, and more
likely to take over their partner’s role when necessary. There was no clear difference in children’s tendency to tattle on their
partner’s cheating behavior or their tendency to distribute rewards equally at the end. It thus appears that by 3 years of age
making a joint commitment to act together with others is beginning to engender in children a ‘‘we’’-intentionality which
holds across at least most of the process of the joint activity until the shared goal is achieved, and which withstands at least
some of the perturbations to the joint activity children experience.
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Introduction
Humans act together in various ways every day, achieving goals
one individual alone could never achieve. Recently, research in
developmental psychology has begun to address the question of
when young children begin to act together with others intention-
ally in pursuit of joint goals, and what they understand about
various aspects of joint activities [1]. There is increasing evidence
that children begin to participate in joint activities early in
ontogeny, suggesting that they are both motivated to act together
with others and able to coordinate their actions with others.
Already in their second year of life, infants engage in collaborative
activities with adults such as in ritualized or even novel social
games and simple problem-solving tasks [2–6]. Somewhat later, at
the beginning of their third year of life, they also begin to act
jointly with same-aged peers [7–13]. Moreover, a recent study
suggests that young children act together with their partner with
an understanding of the other as a mental agent with whom they
share intentional states [14]. Together, these findings suggest that
young children may have an understanding of joint activities that
goes beyond just coordinating actions and includes shared goals
and intentions [15–22].
However, one of the challenges when studying young children’s
understanding of joint activity is to distinguish whether children
really understand themselves as an active partner in a joint activity
or not, since when all goes well it is often not so easy to know how
jointly partners are acting, even in adults. If two people are
walking side by side, an observer might not know whether they
were doing so together or not until something happens. That is, if
one stops to tie his shoes and the other keeps going, it is likely that
they are not walking together in any meaningful way. In contrast,
if one stops and the other feels obligated to wait and to help if
needed, an observer would know that they were walking together.
Their behavior would indicate that they are jointly committed to
act together, with all the rights and obligations that this entails
[23–26].
Previous studies have shown that young children have some
basic understanding of some simple joint commitments. For
example, children under 2 years of age will wait for their partners
when needed and help by attempting to reengage them during
interruptions in their joint activity [3], [4], [14]. Older children
understand that this is only required when one has a joint
commitment with one’s partner: Gra¨fenhain, Behne, Carpenter,
and Tomasello [27] showed that 3-year-old and older children
understand that when acting together, but not when simply acting
in parallel, both partners are obligated either to continue acting or
to take leave of the activity in some way. And Hamann,
Warneken, and Tomasello [28] have shown that 3-year-olds
understand that if they get access to their part of a joint reward
earlier than their partner, they should continue acting until their
partner also gets access to his/her reward. Together, these findings
suggest that already by 3 years of age, children have an
understanding of some of the most basic obligations engendered
by joint commitments to act together.
But in adults, at least, these obligations can go much further
than waiting for and helping one’s partner. For example, adults
can be surprisingly loyal to their joint action partners. Especially
after having acted together for some time, adults’ sense of
solidarity can become so strong that they might occasionally cover
for a lazy partner who does not fulfill her role [29], [30], or cover
up for bad (e.g., cheating or unlawful) behavior by a partner, for
example, to protect social relationships [31–33]. Not only do
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adults cover for, or cover up this type of behavior, but at the end,
they often share the rewards equally even with partners who did
not contribute equally to the outcome (e.g., when all the team
members – and even the fans – of a winning soccer team are
allowed to claim that they won the game).
We know very little about whether young children, like adults,
go beyond waiting for and helping a joint action partner who stops
acting. There is some research on relevant topics outside the
context of joint action. For example, we know that preschoolers
grow increasingly skillful at telling lies to protect another person’s
feelings [34], [35]. Further, research on young children’s sense of
distributive justice has shown that young children are more likely
to distribute resources fairly with familiar persons (e.g., friends)
than with unfamiliar or unpopular partners [36], [37], and that
they share resources fairly when both partners have contributed
equally to a joint goal [38], [39]. However, with the exception of
these last two studies, these things have not yet been investigated
within joint vs. non-joint action contexts.
In the current study we sought to fill this gap by investigating
whether young children would show a similar sense of the various
obligations that follow from a joint commitment as shown by
adults. We therefore engaged children in a game that they played
either jointly with a partner or individually, that is, in parallel to
another player. The game’s goal was to assemble a puzzle, for
which players were promised a reward. In the course of the game,
we confronted children with several unexpected events and
assessed whether children reacted differently to these events
depending on the respective play context. The list of unexpected
events was certainly not an exhaustive one, but rather a non-
incidental selection of events that potentially perturb joint actions
and challenge the partners’ sense of joint commitments to act
together [15], [22–24]. In particular, in Study 1, we investigated
whether, along with waiting for and helping their joint action
partner, children would also be willing to take over the partner’s
role when she was reluctant to fulfill it, to cover up for the
partner’s cheating behavior, and to share the reward at the end
fairly with her even though she had not contributed equally to the
joint action. If young children’s reactions to these events differed
systematically when acting together with a joint partner as
compared with when acting alone, this would indicate a much
richer and more sophisticated understanding of joint activities than
previous research has thus far suggested. Given the findings of
previous studies that 3-year-old children readily engage in
cooperative activities [27], [28], we tested 3-year-old children.
Study 1
In Study 1, using a between-subjects design, children either
agreed to play a puzzle game with a play partner and then
completed the puzzle together with the partner (collaborative
condition), or else children were encouraged to play the game
alone, and completed their own puzzle while another player
played the game in parallel, on a separate, identical puzzle nearby
(individual condition). Children’s play partner in both conditions was
a puppet operated by an adult experimenter. A puppet was used to
provide children with a play partner who was on a similar social
level to themselves. Based on previous studies [40], [41], we
expected children to interact with a puppet more informally than
with an adult partner and also to feel less inhibited about tattling
on a puppet’s transgressions than on those of an adult.
The goal of the game was to complete the puzzle in order to
receive a reward. On the way to achieving this goal, five events
unfolded. First, when the players had to walk to a different corner
of the room to fetch something for the game and the puppet
stopped walking, we assessed whether children would adapt their
behavior to this interruption of the walk (e.g., by waiting for the
puppet). Second, when the puppet accidentally caused damage, we
assessed whether children would help her repair the damage and
then later try to cover up for her behavior by not indicating her as
the source of the damage when questioned by the experimenter.
Third, after the puppet cheated by stealing some puzzle pieces to
complete the game early, we assessed whether children would
cover up for her behavior by not tattling on her when later
questioned by the experimenter. Fourth, when the puppet was
reluctant to fulfill her role, we assessed whether children would
take over her role and complete it for her. Finally, at the end we
assessed whether children would distribute a reward equally
between themselves and the puppet, despite the difficulties she
caused throughout the procedure.
If children understood that agreeing to act together engenders
certain obligations whereas participating in individual activities
does not, children should react differently in each of the five tests
in the two conditions. In particular, we expected more children in
the collaborative than in the individual condition 1) to adapt their
behavior to an interruption of the activity, 2) to help the partner
repair the damage she caused, 3) to cover up for the partner’s
deviant behavior, that is, not to indicate the partner as the source
of the damage and not to tattle on her cheating behavior (despite
the fact that in both conditions children benefitted equally from
this cheating behavior), 4) to take over the partner’s role when she
was reluctant to fulfill it, and 5) to share the reward fairly with the
puppet.
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement. The studies were approved by the Max
Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology Child Subjects
Committee. They were done with the written informed consent of
the children’s parents, and in accordance with all applicable laws
and rules governing psychological research in Germany.
Participants. Thirty-six 3-year-old children participated in
the study (18 girls; mean age = 3;6;02, range = 3;4;11–3;7;29).
Children (in both studies) were recruited from a database of
parents who had agreed to participate in studies of children’s
social-cognitive development.
Families were from heterogeneous socioeconomic backgrounds
in a middle-size city in Germany. The majority of children
regularly attended day care centers (86%) and had siblings (62%,
of which 57% had younger siblings, 29% had older siblings, and
14% had both younger and older siblings). Children received a
small gift at the end of the test session.
Materials. Children played a puzzle game with a large, child-
like puppet (height 50 cm) with legs and a moveable mouth and
hands. For the girls the puppet was introduced as a girl and for the
boys as a boy (for the sake of convenience, we will refer to the
puppet as ‘she’ throughout).
The goal of the puzzle game was to complete the puzzle in order
to receive a reward. The puzzle was a Styrofoam board
(length6width6depth: 7264465 cm) with a scene of a child’s
room with various toys in it pasted on top. Several square holes (4
cm3) were cut out of the Styrofoam over pictures of toys, and the
toys’ pictures were pasted to the bottom of the holes. Into these
holes could be placed a series of nine wooden cubes with matching
toy pictures on them (see Figure 1).
At the start of the game, these puzzle pieces were contained in a
box (38630626 cm) with a moveable chute at the end (see
Figure 2). It was explained to children that only the experimenter
could retrieve the puzzle pieces (from a door on the back side of
this box). To receive each puzzle piece, players had to place two
Consequences of Joint Commitments
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small, colored, wooden blocks (2.5 cm3 each) onto the chute and
raise the chute so the blocks would fall down into the box.
In the collaborative condition (see below), players played
together on the same toys (i.e., there was only one puzzle board
and one chute). In each trial, each player received one block of a
different color to place onto the chute. In the individual condition,
in contrast, there were two identical puzzle boards and chutes and
players played with them separately to emphasize the individual
nature of the game. In each trial, each player therefore received
two blocks of the same color (with a different color for each
partner) to place onto the chutes.
The session was recorded by four cameras fixed at the four
corners of the testing room.
Design and procedure. Children were randomly assigned to
one of two conditions in a between-subjects design. Thus, 18
children were assigned to the collaborative and 18 to the
individual condition. Gender was approximately evenly distributed
between conditions. The sequence of the five tasks was the same
for every child. Two adults administered the test sessions, each
performing a fixed role. Both were naı¨ve regarding the hypotheses
of the study. The experimenter directed the test session and asked
the test questions. The assistant operated the puppet.
Children were tested individually in a child studies laboratory in
a testing session lasting approximately 45 minutes. After a brief
familiarization period with the experimenter, the puppet was
introduced to the child. The experimenter interacted with the
puppet as if she were another familiar play partner on a similar
social level as the child and encouraged the child to play with her.
Children were then led to the testing room. Parents were not
present in the room but watched the scene through a one-way
mirror. Both children and parents had agreed on the parents not
being present before the test session started. Children were not
aware that their parents were watching them.
The two experimental conditions differed in how the puzzle
game was initiated (i.e., with or without an agreement to play
together) and how the players played the game (i.e., jointly or in
parallel). The procedure of the five subsequent tests was identical
for all children in both conditions. The following section describes
the game and each test in detail.
Demonstration. After a brief familiarization phase in the test
room, the experimenter introduced the puzzle game. Sitting
behind the puzzle board(s) facing the players, she showed the
board(s) to the players, encouraged them to label the depicted
objects, and drew the players’ attention to the missing pieces of the
puzzle board. She announced that each player would receive a
reward when the puzzle(s) were completed. To demonstrate how
players could get access to the missing puzzle pieces, she presented
the chute(s) and demonstrated how to operate it. She took one of
the colored blocks, counted ‘‘One, two, three!’’ and raised the
chute to let the block slide down into the box. She repeated this
with a second block. She then opened a door at the back of the
box, retrieved one puzzle piece and put it into the appropriate
location on the puzzle board. She emphasized that she would
provide players with two blocks in each round and that they would
only receive one puzzle piece at a time (i.e., in the collaborative
condition a total of two blocks and one puzzle piece and in the
individual condition two blocks and one puzzle piece each). Note
that in the individual condition, the experimenter provided each
player with separate toys. She therefore first demonstrated the
game to the child and then turned away toward the puppet and
repeated the demonstration for her, to emphasize the individual
play context (thus in this condition children could potentially
watch a second demonstration of the game).
Initiation of the game. The goal of the initiation phase was
to establish the respective play context. Thus, in the collaborative
condition, the puppet invited the child to play together with her: She
asked, ‘‘Will you play with me?’’, awaited a verbal (e.g., ‘‘yes’’) or
nonverbal (e.g., nod) agreement from the child (thus establishing
the joint commitment), and emphasized that they now would play
this fun game together. All children readily agreed. The puppet
and the child then jointly played the game for three rounds. That
is, after the experimenter provided the players with the blocks, the
puppet coordinated her actions with the child (e.g., taking turns
putting blocks in the chute and encouraging the child to raise it
together to let the blocks slide into the box), and conferred with the
child about where to put the next puzzle piece. At the end of each
round, the puppet looked at the child and said, ‘‘We did a good
job!’’ In the individual condition, the experimenter announced that
each player would now play on his or her own toy and the puppet
additionally announced that she would now play this fun game. In
the following three rounds, the puppet played individually by not
coordinating her actions with and not attending to the child, and
by not talking to the child while searching for where to put the new
puzzle piece. However, the puppet talked to herself from time to
time, resulting in a similar amount of speech as in the collaborative
condition. She did all this in an unhurried, relaxed manner, so that
Figure 1. Puzzle board with the scene of a child’s room pasted
on top. Nine wooden cubes could be placed into the squares with
matching toy pictures on them. In the individual condition, each player
played on a separate but identical puzzle board.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0073039.g001
Figure 2. Box containing the puzzle pieces with a moveable
chute at one end. Players let two small blocks go down the chute to
get access to the puzzle pieces.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0073039.g002
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there was no suggestion of a competition. In addition, to avoid the
possibility of one of the players finishing the puzzle much earlier
than the other (and so that the tests could be administered as
planned), the experimenter inconspicuously provided the players
with the blocks at at least similar points in time. At the end of each
round (i.e., after both the child and the puppet had put their block
in the puzzle), the puppet said, ‘‘I did a good job!’’ This was done
to attract the child’s attention to the puppet’s activities even
though she was playing individually. For each of the following five
tests, the procedure was identical in both conditions.
1. Interruption test. After three rounds of play, the
experimenter announced that there were some blocks missing
and that they needed to find them before they could continue
playing. She looked around, saying that there should be some
more blocks somewhere in the room. At this point, the puppet
turned around in the direction of two identical containers
(height6diameter: 15613 cm each) situated in another corner of
the room (at a distance of about 3 m diagonal from the play area)
and announced that there should be some more blocks over there.
She then started walking in the direction of the containers.
However, midway to the containers, she suddenly stopped walking
to fix her cap, which had fallen off onto the floor, calling attention
to her stopping by exclaiming, ‘‘Oh no, my cap!’’. The puppet
then distractedly took 15 seconds to replace her cap (the end of this
and all other response phases was signaled by the experimenter,
who inconspicuously cleared her throat). Then she started walking
again, took one of the containers and returned to the experiment-
er. Note that throughout this whole test, the puppet (and the
experimenter) never encouraged children to accompany her to the
containers, and the puppet did not attend to children. Still, all but
three children in the individual condition also walked over to the
other corner, got one of the containers, and handed it over to the
experimenter to continue playing the game. The three children
who did not start walking were later excluded from the analysis of
this test (see below).
2. Damage test. The experimenter always first took the
container the child had brought back and then reached for the
puppet’s container. As the puppet moved her arm back after
handing her container to the experimenter, she accidentally
knocked over the puzzle board (i.e., the communal board in the
collaborative condition and her own board in the individual
condition), making the puzzle pieces fall out of the board. She
exclaimed, ‘‘Oops, oh no!’’ and then kept sitting in front of the
board, looking at the board with her hand held in front of her
mouth. Until this point, from the moment she had received the
container from the puppet, the experimenter had pretended to be
distracted by something behind her back. She now turned back to
the players, expressed surprise at the fallen board, and neutrally
asked the child two questions: 1) ‘‘What happened, [child’s
name]?’’, and 2) ‘‘How did it happen, [child’s name]?’’. She gave
children 10 seconds to respond after each question and always
asked both questions irrespective of the child’s responses and of
whether or not children were occupied helping the puppet repair
the damage (e.g., by picking up the puzzle board and collecting
and replacing the puzzle pieces back into the board). To finish the
test, the experimenter then announced that this was nothing to
worry about and repaired the damage if children had not already
done so.
3. Cheating test. To re-establish the respective play context,
the players then played three further rounds of the game according
to the condition. In addition, children were reminded of the rules
of the game to set up the following test. That is, after the
experimenter had announced that there were only a few more
puzzle pieces missing and that players would soon be able to
receive their reward, to speed things along the puppet asked the
experimenter whether she could give them more than one puzzle
piece this time. The experimenter said no and emphasized that she
would only provide one piece. When there were only two puzzle
pieces missing (in the individual condition, the assistant made sure
that this was also the case for the child’s board), the experimenter
inconspicuously placed the last two puzzle pieces next to the
chute(s) and pretended to be distracted by something behind her.
The puppet spotted the last puzzle pieces, said, ‘‘Oh, there are the
last two puzzle pieces! If I took them, it would be cheating but
still…’’, then took them and put them into the board(s) (i.e., in the
collaborative condition she put them into the communal board
and in the individual condition she first put them in her board and
then repeated this for the child’s board, ensuring that in both
conditions children benefitted equally from the puppet’s cheating
behavior). The puppet finally announced that the puzzle(s) were
completed and that now the experimenter could provide the
reward. The experimenter turned around, expressed surprise at
this, and neutrally asked the child three questions: 1) ‘‘What
happened, [child’s name]?’’, 2) ‘‘How did it happen, [child’s
name]?’’, and 3) ‘‘Did anyone cheat?’’, looking only at the child.
Again she always asked all three questions and gave children 10
seconds to respond after each question. While the experimenter
was asking the child these questions, the puppet stayed slightly
turned away from the child and pretended to be distracted by her
cap, so that children would not feel intimidated by her. Then, to
resolve the situation, the puppet admitted that she had taken the
last puzzle pieces and apologized for her behavior.
4. Tidying up test. Since the puzzle was now completed and
the game was thus almost finished, the experimenter announced
that before getting the promised reward, the blocks first had to be
tidied up. She therefore took 14 blocks (7 of each color) out of the
chute(s) and put them, clumped together, between the players.
Next, she took out the two identical containers (previously used in
the Interruption and Damage tests) and repeated, ‘‘Before
receiving the rewards, the blocks have to be tidied up. They have
to go in here.’’ She put one container in front of each player and
then again she turned away, pretending to be distracted by
something behind her. The puppet, however, lazily did not
complete her role: She put one of her blocks into her container,
then picked up another, but then let it fall to the floor, saying, ‘‘Oh
no, that’s no fun!’’ She then pretended to be distracted by her cap
for 20 seconds. If the child had not finished tidying up all the
blocks by the end of those 20 seconds, the experimenter turned
around, encouraged the puppet to tidy up once more and again
turned her back to the players. The puppet then repeated her
unwillingness to do this and pretended to be distracted for another
20 seconds. If the child had not tidied up all the blocks by then, the
experimenter firmly asked the puppet to finish the task so she
could present the rewards and she did so.
5. Sharing test. To finish the session, the experimenter
announced that before receiving the final big reward, she had a
small reward for the previous tidying up. She put seven stickers in
front of the child and provided two small, differently colored
containers (height6diameter: 1068.5 cm), placing one in front of
the child and one in front of the puppet and explaining that one
was for the child and one was for the puppet. She then told the
child, ‘‘The stickers for the puppet have to go in this container and
the stickers for you have to go in that container. Would you please
divide them up?’’ She reminded the child that the stickers were a
reward for the tidying up and turned her back to the players. She
repeated this instruction during the response phase if necessary
(e.g., when encouraging the child). While the child distributed the
stickers, the puppet was turned away from the child pretending to
Consequences of Joint Commitments
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be distracted by her cap. After the child had finished, the players
were given the stickers and the child received the final reward in
the form of a small toy to take home.
Coding and reliability. We were mainly interested in
whether children responded to the various tests differently
depending on the respective (collaborative vs. individual) play
context. The supporting information provides a detailed descrip-
tion of the coding criteria: Table S1.
1. Interruption test. In this task, the puppet started walking
to two containers in another corner of the room. Midway to the
containers, she unexpectedly stopped walking for 15 sec and we
coded whether children adapted their behavior to this interruption
(by either waiting for her to continue walking or by helping her), or
whether they continued walking alone and brought one of the
containers back to the experimenter.
2. Damage test. When handing her container to the
experimenter, the puppet accidentally knocked over the puzzle
board. We were mainly interested in 1) whether children
spontaneously helped repair the damage (e.g., by picking up the
puzzle board or collecting and replacing the puzzle pieces), and 2)
when children started helping, that is, whether they started to
repair the damage before the experimenter turned around and
asked any questions, after question 1, or after question 2.
In addition, when the experimenter asked what had happened
and how it had happened, we coded whether or not children
indicated the puppet as the source of the damage or whether they
avoided indicating her. Thus, for each question, we coded whether
children showed one of the following types of behavior: a)
indicating the puppet either verbally or nonverbally; b) responding
uninformatively either verbally or nonverbally (e.g., responding
that the board had fallen over without indicating who had caused
the damage); or c) not clearly responding to the question.
3. Cheating test. The puppet cheated in order to speed
things along. When questioned about the event by the experi-
menter, we were interested in whether or not children would tattle
on the puppet’s cheating behavior. The coding was identical to
that for the questions in the Damage test. In addition, children
were directly asked whether someone had cheated. We coded
whether children admitted that there had been cheating (verbally
or nonverbally), denied the cheating (verbally or nonverbally), or
whether they did not respond to this question at all.
4. Tidying up test. In this test, players were presented with
two containers and were encouraged to tidy up 14 blocks, but the
puppet did not complete her role. We were mainly interested in
whether children picked up the slack for the lazy puppet and took
over her role as well as their own. Thus, we coded whether
children tidied up a) all blocks, b) at least half of the blocks, or c)
less than half of the blocks (the exact number of blocks could not
be coded reliably from recordings since children frequently picked
up and put in several blocks at a time). We also realized during
coding that which container(s) children put the blocks into might
be interesting since the experimenter had not instructed the
players about which container(s) they should put the blocks into
and did not watch the tidying up. Children could thus easily
indicate their own contribution to the tidying up by putting all the
blocks they tidied up into their own container. Alternatively,
children could put blocks into both containers, hindering the
experimenter from knowing which blocks each player had tidied
up and/or giving the puppet (undeserved) credit for cleaning up all
her blocks. We therefore coded into which container children
sorted the blocks: only their own container, only the puppet’s, or
both containers.
5. Sharing test. Children were presented with seven stickers,
which they were told to distribute into two containers based on the
players’ previous tidying up performance. We coded the number
of stickers children put into their own and into the puppet’s
container.
Behavior across tests. Children participated in a variety of
tests. We were therefore interested in whether children’s behavior
was consistent across the tests, for example, whether children who
waited for the puppet in the Interruption test later also took over
her part in the Tidying Up test. We therefore binarily coded the
main measures for each child in each test. In particular, we coded
whether or not children waited or helped the puppet (Interruption
test), were reluctant to indicate or to tattle on the puppet (Damage
and Cheating tests), cleaned up all blocks (Tidying Up test), and
shared the stickers more or less equally (i.e., gave the puppet at
least 3 out of 7 stickers; Sharing test).
Children’s behavior was coded from the video recordings by the
first author. A second coder who was blind to the hypotheses of the
study coded a random selection of the sample (14 children, 38% of
the sample) resulting in good inter-observer reliability: Interrup-
tion test: 86% agreement between coders, k= .71 for the waiting
measure; Damage test: 100% agreement, k= 1 for the helping
measure; Damage and Cheating tests, 85% agreement, k= .75 for
children’s responses to the experimenter’s questions; Tidying Up
test: 93% agreement, k’s = .85 for both tidying up the blocks and
children’s use of containers; Sharing test: 93% agreement, k= .89
for children’s distribution of the stickers to the players).
Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses. Preliminary analyses revealed no
effect of gender on any of the measures. This factor was therefore
collapsed for the following analyses. In the Damage and Cheating
tests, children were asked two different questions by the
experimenter (what had happened and how it had happened).
Overall, children responded actively in the majority of response
phases by either indicating the puppet or by responding
uninformatively to the experimenter’s questions (M= 67% of
response phases). The effects reported below are thus not due to a
general reluctance to respond to the experimenter’s questions. We
further found no systematic differences in children’s responses to
the two questions in either test (Wilcoxon signed ranks test, p’s
..51). For each test, we therefore collapsed children’s responses
across the two questions (i.e., what had happened and how it had
happened), coding whether children indicated the puppet at least
once.
Each test consisted of only one trial per child, so we conducted
Chi-square tests. All p values reported are two-tailed.
1. Interruption test. We compared the number of children
who adapted their behavior to the puppet’s interruption in walking
(by either waiting for the puppet or by helping her) to the number
of children who continued walking without reacting to the
puppet’s behavior as a function of condition. Three children did
not start walking to fetch the containers but remained sitting with
the experimenter (all in the individual condition). These children
were not included in the following analysis. The results revealed
that significantly more children in the collaborative condition
(67%) reacted to the interruption than children in the individual
condition (20%; Chi-square test, x2 (1, N= 33) = 7.19, p,.05;
Odds ratio = 8). Thus, when children had agreed to play together
with the puppet, they were more likely to adapt their behavior to
the (unexpected) behavior of the puppet than when they had
played individually. This suggests that 3-year-olds understand that
when they are jointly committed to play together, partners should
coordinate their behavior with each other not only during the
actual joint activity (e.g., by coordinating where to put the puzzle
pieces) but also when they are confronted with unexpected events
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related more tangentially to the main joint activity. This finding is
thus reminiscent of the commitments that adults feel in Gilbert’s
famous example of two people ‘taking a walk together’ [23].
2. Damage test. The puppet caused (accidental) damage and
we were interested in whether children would spontaneously help
repair the damage. Although twice as many children in the
collaborative condition (56%) as in the individual condition (28%)
helped at some point during the response phases, this difference
was not significant (Chi-square test, p..17; Odds ratio = 3.25).
However, when we considered when children started to help the
puppet, we found that 44% of children in the collaborative
condition helped even before the experimenter had turned around
and noticed that damage had occurred, whereas no child in the
individual condition helped at that early point in time. This
difference reached significance (Chi-square test, x2 (1,
N= 36) = 10.29, p,.01; Odds ratio = 15.5), (note that for calcu-
lating the odds ratio with a cell of zero, a constant of .5 was added
to each cell).
Next, we were interested in whether children indicated the
puppet as the source of the damage when questioned by the
experimenter, in particular, whether children in the collaborative
condition were especially reluctant to indicate the puppet. We thus
compared the number of children who indicated the puppet at
least once with the number of children who never indicated her
(by responding uninformatively or not at all). We found that
overall, only a minority of children indicated her, and they did so
equally in both conditions (28% of children in the collaborative
and 33% of children in the individual condition, Chi-square test,
p= 1; Odds ratio = 0.77).
Since we assessed two different types of behavior after the
puppet had caused damage, we were interested in whether
children’s behavior was consistent when reacting to the damage,
for example, whether children who first supported the puppet by
helping repair the damage would also be reluctant to indicate her
as the source of the damage when later questioned by the
experimenter. In the next set of analyses, we therefore tested
whether children’s helping behavior was related to their indicating
the puppet. We found that in the collaborative condition,
children’s helping behavior was linked (negatively) to their
indicating (Chi-square test, x2 (1, N= 18) = 8.65, p,.01; Odds
ratio = 2.2). In particular, all 10 of the children who helped the
puppet did not indicate her when later questioned by the
experimenter, and none of the five children who indicated the
puppet had previously helped her repair the damage. No such
relation was found for children in the individual condition (Chi-
square test, p..6; Odds ratio = 0.4): Only four children in this
condition both helped and declined to indicate the puppet.
Thus, children did not differ between conditions in their
reluctance to indicate the puppet when she had caused damage.
However, they did differ in their helping behavior in that those
children who had previously played together with the puppet
spontaneously helped repair the damage before the experimenter
had even noticed that the damage had occurred. This finding must
be taken with some caution, however, as it is possible that children
in the collaborative condition helped more quickly because the
damage had occurred to the puzzle that they themselves were
working on. Still, it is interesting that it was these particular
children who later were reluctant to indicate the puppet as the
source of the damage. Children who had played individually, in
contrast, did not show such consistent, systematic behavior. Thus,
it appears that 3-year-old children understand that when they are
jointly committed to act together, partners should help each other
when necessary, thereby ensuring that the joint activity could be
continued.
3. Cheating test. Children had witnessed the puppet
cheating in order to receive the game’s final reward earlier than
expected. Upon being questioned by the experimenter, we were
interested in whether children differed in tattling on the puppet’s
behavior as a function of condition. We found that, as in the
Damage test, only a minority of children tattled, and they did so
equally in both conditions (28% of children in each condition,
Chi-square test, p= 1; Odds ratio = 1). When children were
directly asked whether someone had cheated in question 3,
children also reacted equally in both conditions: 56% of children
in each condition admitted that there had been cheating (Chi-
square test, p= 1; Odds ratio = 0.97). Thus, children were
generally reluctant to tattle on the puppet’s transgression,
irrespective of whether or not they had been playing together
with her (see below for further discussion of this finding).
4. Tidying up test. Players were asked to tidy up some blocks
before receiving the game’s final reward; however, the puppet was
lazy and did not complete her role. We were interested in whether
or not children picked up the slack for her and performed her role
differently as a function of condition. We found that 78% of
children in the collaborative condition tidied up all blocks whereas
only 50% of children in the individual condition did so. This
difference was not significant (Chi-square test, p..16; Odds
ratio = 3.5). However, children in the collaborative condition
cleaned up all blocks significantly more often than expected by
chance (binomial tests of the binarily-coded data against the fixed
value of.5, p,.05), whereas children in the individual condition
were at chance (p= 1).
Next we looked at which containers children used when tidying
up: only one container, (either their own or the puppet’s), or both
containers. One child in the control condition had to be excluded
from analyses because she immediately cleaned up all her blocks
and pushed them over to the experimenter without using any
container. We found that twice as many children in the
collaborative condition (72%) as in the individual condition
(35%) divided the blocks into both containers. Given that the
majority of children who only used one container used their own
(80% in the collaborative and 100% in the individual condition),
we collapsed the data of children using one container and binarily
coded whether children used one or both containers. The Chi-
square test between conditions revealed a significant difference (x2
(1, N= 35) = 4.8, p,.05; Odds ratio = 4.77). Finally, we compared
whether children used both containers more often than expected
by chance. We found that children did not use both containers
more often than expected by chance in either condition (binomial
tests, p..09). Again, since we assessed two different types of tidying
up behavior (the number of blocks and the containers children
used), we were interested in whether children’s behavior was
consistent. We found that the number of blocks children tidied up
was significantly positively correlated with the containers they used
to tidy up, both across conditions and within the collaborative
condition separately (across conditions: rho= .55, p,.01, N= 35;
collaborative condition: rho= .58, p,.05, N= 18; for the individual
condition it was marginally significant: rho= .45, p = .07, N= 17).
Thus, again we see consistency in children’s behavior, especially in
the collaborative condition.
In sum, although there was no significant difference in how
many children tidied up all the blocks, children in the collaborative
condition tidied up significantly more blocks than expected by
chance, and they were more likely to use both containers to tidy up
the blocks. It is unclear at this point why these children used both
containers and there are several possible explanations. One could
argue that children merely used both containers because they
needed more space to store the blocks. This is unlikely, however,
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given that half of the children in the individual condition tidied up
all blocks but mainly used their own, that is, only one container.
Alternatively, children may generously have tried to give the
puppet (i.e., their play partner) credit for her previous play
behavior by taking over her role in the activity. Or children may
have tried to hide the puppet’s lazy behavior by deceiving the
experimenter about who did what when presenting two containers
filled with blocks. Future research may look at what motivation
drove children in the collaborative condition (but not in the
individual condition) to show this particular type of behavior.
Together, the findings of the Tidying Up test suggest that children
who had played jointly with the puppet were slightly more likely to
take over her role when necessary than children who had played
individually. Three-year-old children thus may be beginning to
understand that when jointly committed, partners need to support
each other, even to the extent of taking up the slack for partners
who do not complete their role. Children who had played
individually, in contrast, were not as ready to take over more of the
task than they were expected to.
5. Sharing test. Children were encouraged to distribute
seven stickers into two containers (one for each player) as a reward
for the players’ tidying up behavior in the Tidying Up test. There
was no difference between conditions in the number of stickers
children distributed to themselves vs. the puppet (mean number of
stickers children distributed to themselves in the collaborative
condition: M= 4.1, SE= .36; in the individual condition: M= 4.9,
SE= .42; independent samples t-test, t(34) =21.5, p= .14). How-
ever, when we compared the mean number of stickers children
distributed to themselves with the chance level of 3.5 (i.e., half of
the stickers), we found that children in the individual condition
distributed significantly more stickers to themselves than expected
by chance (one-sample t-test, t(17) = 3.4, p,.01), whereas children
in the collaborative condition did not differ from chance level
(p..11). Thus, in the collaborative condition, children distributed
the sticker rewards equally, even though their partner had not
‘pulled her weight’ during the previous Tidying Up test. This
finding extends previous research on young children’s distributive
justice in collaborative activities [38], [39], [42] by showing that
children distribute the reward fairly even when the partners did
not contribute equally to the joint outcome.
Behavior across tests. To test whether children’s behavior
was consistent across the five different tests, we conducted
Cochran’s Q tests, for each condition separately. This analysis
tests the hypothesis that children’s behavior does not differ
systematically across the tests, in other words, it tests whether
children who had reacted to the puppet’s interruption in the
Interruption test, for example, later helped the puppet in the
Damage test and took over her role in the Tidying Up test. Results
revealed that in the individual condition, children behaved rather
inconsistently across tests (Cochran’s Q = 12.41, N= 18, df= 4,
p,.05; note that for this analysis, the three children who did not
start walking to fetch the container in the Interruption test were
included). In contrast, children’s behavior in the collaborative
condition was more consistent and systematic across the five
different tests (Cochran’s Q = .56, N= 18, df = 4, p= .99). Thus,
although children’s behavior did not differ significantly between
conditions in all of the tasks, children’s performance in the
collaborative condition was systematically partner-directed and
held even across events with negative behavior on the part of the
partner (e.g., the puppet cheating or being lazy). This indicates
that the initial joint commitment was quite robust against
disturbances whereas no such stabilizing element seemed to be
present in the individual condition.
Taken together, the findings of Study 1 suggest not only that 3-
year-old children understand that agreeing to act together
obligates partners to continue acting until the shared goal is
achieved [27], [28] but also that children of this young age are
starting to understand a range of consequences that joint
commitments may entail: They wait for and help their partner if
necessary, and support her and tend to share the activity’s
outcome equally with her (even if she put in less work). This
suggests an even more sophisticated understanding of what it
means to act together than suggested by previous research.
One surprising finding, however, was that most children in the
study were reluctant to tattle on the puppet, even when they had
previously played the game individually. We had expected
children in the individual condition to feel less obligated to protect
the puppet than children who had a joint commitment to play
together with her. Similarly, in the Sharing test, although we found
that children who had played together with the puppet shared the
reward equally with her, whereas children who had played
individually distributed more stickers to themselves, this difference
was relatively weak in that the conditions did not differ
significantly from each other. One possible explanation for both
of these findings is that the puppet was present when children were
questioned by the experimenter in the Cheating test and while
they distributed the stickers in the Sharing test, so children might
have felt constrained or inhibited by her presence and ability to
observe their responses. We therefore conducted a follow-up study,
in which we administered some of the tasks from Study 1 (the
Cheating, Tidying Up and Sharing tests) with the puppet absent
when children were asked about the cheating situation and while
they distributed the stickers. The goal of Study 2 was thus to
investigate whether children would be more likely to tattle on the
puppet or to distribute the rewards differently in a more
anonymous setting.
Study 2
In Study 2, we first had 3-year-olds engage in collaborative or
individual play as in Study 1. Then we administered only three of
the five tests – the Cheating test, the Tidying Up test and the
Sharing test. In contrast to Study 1, during the response phase of
these tests the puppet was distracted in a different corner of the
room when children were asked the test questions in the Cheating
test and when they had to distribute the stickers in the Sharing test.
We thus expected children to feel less observed and less overheard
by her during these test phases. In addition, to reduce noise in the
Tidying Up test (because for some of the children the puppet
ended up tidying her blocks), in this study the experimenter
finished tidying up the last blocks herself if necessary, instead of
making the puppet do it. We also increased the number of stickers
children had to distribute in the Sharing test (9 instead of 7
stickers) and introduced different qualities of stickers (i.e., some
‘fancy’ and some ‘boring’ stickers) to increase children’s motivation
to consider which sticker they distributed to which player [43].
Again we predicted that children’s behavior would differ as a
function of play context (i.e., collaborative vs. individual play). In
particular, we expected that children who had agreed to play
together with the puppet would be more reluctant to tattle on the
puppet after her cheating and more likely to distribute the sticker
rewards fairly between the players than children who had played
the game individually.
Materials and Methods
Participants. Thirty-six different 3-year-old children partic-
ipated in the study (18 girls; mean age = 3;6;08, range = 3;2;25–
Consequences of Joint Commitments
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 September 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e73039
3;11;10). The majority of children regularly attended day care
centers (97%) and had siblings (77%, of which 78% had younger
and 22% had older siblings). Six additional children were tested
but could not be included in the final analyses because of
uncooperative behavior (4 children) or experimenter error (2
children).
Materials. The same materials were used as in Study 1,
except that in the Sharing test, we presented children with stickers
of different quality: four ‘fancy’ stickers and five ‘boring’ stickers
differing in size, texture and the type of picture depicted on them
(e.g., big, shiny, textured pictures of animals, cars or fairies vs.
small, flat pictures of lady bugs and clovers).
Design and procedure. The sequence of the three tasks was
the same for every child. Two different teams of experimenters
carried out the test sessions in two different cities (both trained and
supervised closely by the first author).
The procedure of the warm-up, demonstration, and initiation
phase was the same as in Study 1. Half of the children agreed to
play the game together with the puppet and played with her on a
single puzzle board and chute (collaborative condition), whereas for
the other half of children, parallel play was initiated and players
played on their own puzzle boards and chutes (individual condition).
1. Cheating test. As in Study 1, children were reminded that
players would only receive one puzzle piece at a time, but the
puppet cheated by taking the last two pieces and putting them into
the puzzle board(s). However, differently from Study 1, after the
puppet announced that the puzzle was completed, she went to a
different corner of the room (about 2.50 m away from the play
scene) to drink some juice (with her back turned to the child). The
experimenter turned around, expressed surprise at the completed
puzzle and neutrally asked the child the same three questions: 1)
‘‘What happened, [child’s name]?’’, 2) ‘‘How did it happen,
[child’s name]?’’, and 3) ‘‘Did anyone cheat?’’ During the whole
response phase, the puppet stayed in her corner with her back
turned pretending to drink. The puppet returned to the play scene
after the experimenter called her back, and apologized for her
behavior.
2. Tidying up test. The procedure of this test was identical to
that of Study 1, with the exception that if the child had not tidied
up all the blocks by the end of the test phase, the experimenter
finished tidying up herself, expressing mild annoyance by saying,
‘‘Well, then it will be me tidying up the blocks.’’
3. Sharing test. Differently from Study 1, the puppet was not
present when the experimenter asked the child to distribute the
stickers: again she went to another corner of the room to drink
some juice (with her back turned). The experimenter put nine
stickers in front of the child, remarking on the stickers’ different
quality (i.e., preferring the ‘fancy’ to the ‘boring’ stickers) and
provided the child with the two containers. While the child
distributed the stickers, the puppet stayed in her corner, her back
turned to the child.
Coding and reliability. The coding procedure was identical
to that of Study 1 except for in the Sharing test. In this test,
children were presented with nine stickers of different quality and
we coded the number and the type of sticker (i.e., the number of
‘fancy’ and ‘boring’ stickers) children put into their own and the
puppet’s container. In order to test whether children’s behavior
was consistent across tests, we binarily coded whether or not
children were reluctant to tattle on the puppet in the Cheating test,
tidied up all the blocks in the Tidying Up test, and distributed the
stickers more or less fairly (i.e., gave the puppet at least 4 out of 9
stickers) in the Sharing test.
Children’s behavior was coded from the video recordings by the
first author. A second coder who was blind to the hypotheses of the
study coded a random selection of the sample (14 children, 38% of
the sample), resulting in excellent reliability: Cheating test:
agreement between coders: 89% of cases, k= .89 for children’s
responses to the experimenter’s questions, Tidying Up test: 100%
agreement, k’s = 1 for both tidying up the blocks and children’s
use of containers; Sharing test: 100% agreement, k= 1 for
children’s distribution of the stickers.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses revealed no effect of children’s gender or
the team of experimenters in the two cities on any of the measures.
These factors were therefore collapsed for the following analyses.
1. Cheating test. Children had witnessed the puppet
cheating to receive the reward earlier than expected and were
then asked two different questions by the experimenter (what had
happened and how it had happened). Overall, children responded
actively in the majority of response phases by either indicating the
puppet or by responding uninformatively (M= 65% of response
phases). The effects reported below are thus not due to a general
reluctance to respond to the test questions. There were no
systematic differences between the two questions (Wilcoxon signed
ranks test, p..78), so we collapsed children’s responses across
questions, coding whether children indicated the puppet at least
once.
We mainly replicated the findings of Study 1 in that only a
minority of children tattled (28% of children in the collaborative
condition, 39% children in the individual condition), with no
significant difference between conditions (Chi-square test, p..7;
Odds ratio = 0.6). When children were directly asked whether
someone had cheated in question 3, children again reacted
similarly in both conditions: 71% of children in the collaborative
condition (out of 17 children; one child could not be coded for
technical reasons) and 56% children in the individual condition
admitted that there had been cheating (Chi-square test, p..48;
Odds ratio = 1.92).
In sum, again children seemed to be reluctant to tattle on the
puppet’s transgression, irrespective of whether they had been
playing together with her or individually – even though the puppet
was across the room with her back turned when children were
questioned by the experimenter.
2. Tidying up test. This test was repeated simply in order to
set up the Sharing test, but we present the results for comparison
with those of Study 1. Regarding the number of blocks that
children tidied up, we found that only one child tidied up less than
half of the blocks and therefore we collapsed the two coding
categories ‘less than half’ and ‘at least half’ of the blocks, to have
two categories: ‘all’ and ‘less than all.’ Almost 27% more children
in the collaborative condition (94%) tidied up all blocks than
children in the individual condition (67%). This difference was
marginally significant (Chi-square test, x2 (1, N= 36) = 4.43,
p= .09; Odds ratio = 8.5). Moreover, children in the collaborative
condition cleaned up all blocks significantly more often than
expected by the chance level of.5 (binomial test, p,.001), whereas
children in the individual condition did not (p..23).
Regarding the containers children used for tidying up, we failed
to replicate the findings of Study 1 in that children were equally
likely to use both containers instead of only one of them (50% of
children in the collaborative condition and 44% of children in the
individual condition used both, Chi-square test, p= 1; Odds
ratio = 1.25). Children did not use both containers more often than
expected by chance in either condition (binomial tests, p..81).
However, again the number of blocks children tidied up was
significantly correlated with the containers they used to tidy up,
both across conditions (rho= .47, p,.01, N= 36) and in the
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individual condition (rho= .63, p,.01, N= 18). In the collaborative
condition, no significant correlation was found (rho= .24, p = .32,
N= 18). This last result, however, was probably caused by the low
variability of behavior given that all but one child in this condition
tidied up all the blocks.
In summary, whereas the specific results of this study differed
somewhat from those of Study 1 in this test, the general pattern of
results across studies suggests that there was some tendency for
children who had played together with the puppet to be more
likely to take over her role and to compensate for her laziness
(either by cleaning up more of her blocks or by putting blocks into
her container for her) than children who had played individually.
3. Sharing test. Children were encouraged to distribute nine
stickers of different quality (4 ‘fancy’ and 5 ‘boring’ stickers) into
two containers (one for each player) as a reward for the previous
tidying up behavior, while the puppet was away. We found no
difference between conditions in the quantity of stickers children
distributed to themselves vs. the puppet (mean number of stickers
distributed to themselves in the collaborative condition: M= 5.4,
SE= .41; in the individual condition: M= 5.7, SE= .62, indepen-
dent samples t-test, t(34) =2.45, p= .66). The same result was
found for the quality of stickers children distributed to themselves
(mean number out of four ‘fancy’ stickers distributed to themselves
in the collaborative condition: M= 2.5, SE= .28; and in the
individual condition: M= 2.9, SE= .26, independent samples t-
test, t(34) = 1.15, p= .26).
In the next step of analyses, we compared the mean (total)
number of stickers children distributed to themselves with the
chance level of 4.5 (i.e., half of the stickers). We found that in the
collaborative condition, children distributed significantly more
stickers to themselves than expected by chance (one-sample t-test:
t(17) = 2.2, p,.05) and that children in the individual condition
tended to do this too (t(17) = 1.9, p = .06). Children’s fair sharing
behavior in Study 1 could thus indeed have resulted from the
puppet being present while children shared the stickers. However,
when comparing the mean number of ‘fancy’ stickers children
distributed to themselves, children in the collaborative condition
did not differ from the chance level of two stickers (p= .10),
whereas children in the individual condition distributed signifi-
cantly more of the fancy stickers to themselves than expected by
chance (t(17) =23.6, p,.01).
Thus, although again some of the specific results differed
between Studies 1 and 2, the general pattern of results suggests
that children who had played together with the puppet distributed
the stickers (or just the best, ‘fancy’ stickers) fairly whereas children
who had played individually distributed more to themselves than
expected by chance. Whether children distributed the stickers
based on quantity (Study 1) or mainly on quality (Study 2), this
finding corroborates recent findings that 3-year-old children are
beginning to consider the value of the resources they distribute
[43], and that, especially in joint action contexts, young children
are capable of sharing resources equally [39], [42].
Behavior across tests. As in Study 1, we tested whether
children’s behavior was consistent across the three different tasks.
We conducted Cochran’s Q tests for each condition separately.
Results revealed that children’s behavior was rather consistently
partner-directed across the three tasks in the collaborative
condition, although in this study it was also consistent (i.e.,
consistently less-partner-directed) in the individual condition (both
p’s ..14).
Analyses across Studies
Some of the results from Studies 1 and 2 were weak or mixed.
One limitation of these studies is the relatively small sample size. It
often happened that findings went in the predicted direction (with
differences of up to 28% of children between conditions) but failed
to reach statistical significance, perhaps due to a lack of power.
Thus in a final set of analyses, across studies we collapsed the data
from the three tests that both studies had in common: the
Cheating, Tidying up and Sharing tests. This allowed us to double
the sample size (to N= 71 or 72, see above). We used binarily-
coded data for analyses because some procedural details differed
between the studies (e.g., the number of stickers used in the
Sharing tests). That is, we binarily coded whether or not children
were reluctant to tattle on the puppet in the Cheating test, tidied
up all the blocks in the Tidying Up test, and distributed the stickers
more or less fairly (i.e., gave the puppet at least 3 out of 7 stickers
in the Sharing test of Study 1 and at least 4 out of 9 stickers in
Study 2). We therefore could only analyze the main measures of
each test.
Cheating Tests
We found that across studies, the majority of children did not
tattle on the puppet and tell the experimenter that she had cheated
to gain the reward earlier than expected (i.e., 72% of children in
the collaborative conditions and 67% of children in the individual
conditions did not tattle). This difference did not reach significance
(Chi-square test, p..79; Odds ratio = 1.3). When directly asked by
the experimenter in question 3, the majority of children in both
conditions admitted that there had been cheating (67% of children
in the collaborative conditions and 56% of children in the
individual conditions, Chi-square test, p..45; Odds ratio = 1.6).
Thus, these findings support the idea that 3-year-old children are
already sensitive to norms against tattling at least in the context of
a game – they do tattle to some extent about moral transgressions
such as destroying someone else’s possessions [41], [44], [45].
Tidying Up Tests
When analyzing whether children across studies tidied up all or
only some/none of the blocks, we found that 86% of children in
the collaborative conditions cleaned up all blocks compared to
only 58% of children in the individual conditions. This difference
was significant (Chi-square test, x2 (1, N= 72) = 6.92, p,.05; Odds
ratio = 4.4).
Again, we compared whether children cleaned up all blocks
significantly more often than expected by chance. We found that
only children in the collaborative conditions did this (binomial test
against the fixed value of.5, p,.01); children in the individual
conditions did not (p= .41). When analyzing which containers
children used for tidying up (i.e., both containers or only one of
them, mainly their own), we found that 61% of children in the
collaborative conditions used both containers compared to 40% of
children in the individual conditions. This difference was
marginally significant (Chi-square test, x2 (1, N= 71) = .3.16,
p = .09; Odds ratio = 2.4).
We found that the number of blocks children tidied up was
significantly positively correlated with the containers they used
(i.e., the more blocks children tidied up the more likely they were
to use both containers), both across conditions and within the
different conditions separately (across conditions: rho= .49, p,.01,
N= 71; collaborative condition: rho= .34, p,.05, N= 36; individ-
ual condition: rho= .55, p,.01, N= 35). Thus, again we see
consistency in children’s behavior.
Consequences of Joint Commitments
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 September 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e73039
Sharing Tests
When analyzing children’s distribution of stickers, we found that
69% of children in the collaborative conditions and 56% of
children in the individual conditions behaved unselfishly: they
gave at least 3 out of 7 or 4 out of 9 stickers to the puppet. This
difference did not reach significance (Chi-square test, p..32; Odds
ratio = 1.82). We then compared whether children gave the
puppet at least this number of stickers more often than expected
by chance. We found that only children in the collaborative
condition did so (binomial test against the fixed value of.5, p,.05),
whereas children in the individual condition did not (p= .62).
In sum, we found that children shared the reward for tidying up
somewhat unsystematically across studies. Children’s behavior did
not differ significantly between conditions; however in two out of
the three comparisons to chance in the two studies, as well as in
this overall analysis, children in the collaborative condition shared
almost equally whereas children in the individual condition did
not.
Behavior across Tests
When comparing the three repeated tests with each other
collapsed across studies, results revealed that children’s behavior
was rather consistent across the test session in the collaborative
conditions, and it was also consistent (i.e., consistently less-partner-
directed) in the individual conditions (both p’s ..24).
General Discussion
Joint commitments are the glue that holds joint action together,
even when something goes wrong. They create a ‘we-attitude’ –
‘we’re in this together’ – that has a wide range of consequences for
participants’ actions which, in adults at least, may go as far as
taking over the role of a lazy partner or covering up for a partner’s
bad behavior. In the current studies, we found that 3-year-old
children understand some of these same consequences as well.
First, we found that after having agreed to play together with a
partner and playing with her briefly, children adapted their own
behavior to an interruption by the partner (when waiting for the
hindered partner in Study 1) whereas children who had played
individually did not. This replicates previous findings on young
children reengaging or waiting for a collaborative partner when
the other suddenly stops acting [3–5], [14], [27]. It also extends
these findings by showing that children adapt their behavior to
that of their partner even when they are confronted with
unexpected events that are related more tangentially to the main
joint activity (in this case, fetching further objects to use in the
main activity). Thus, young children, like adults, are beginning to
understand that collaborative partners are supposed to adapt their
behavior to each other even when unexpected events occur in the
course of a joint activity [23], [24].
Second, we found that 3-year-old children tended to support
their collaborative partner when needed, in various ways. They
helped the puppet repair damage she had caused accidentally (as
children in the individual condition did as well), but did so more
quickly and spontaneously than children in the individual
condition (although alternative explanations for this finding are
possible). Children even tended to take over the puppet’s role for
her when she lazily refused to fulfill it: They tidied up her blocks as
well as their own more often than children who played
individually, with children in the collaborative condition tending
to put her blocks into her container for her instead of putting them
all into their own container. Children thus seemed to be willing to
put more effort into the joint activity than initially designated to
their own role in order to ensure that the joint activity proceeded
successfully.
Third, we found somewhat mixed evidence regarding whether
children were willing to give more credit (in the sense of rewards
for effort) to their partner than perhaps she deserved in the
collaborative condition. These findings mirror the mixed findings
in research on young children’s prosocial and sharing behavior
more generally [36], [37], [39], [46–48]. Thus, future research will
have to investigate further whether 3-year-old children genuinely
understand that, when collaborating, each partner should receive
an equal share of the reward, even if they have not put in an equal
amount of effort. Another finding was that children were quite
reluctant to tattle on the puppet, both when she had caused
damage accidentally and when she had intentionally cheated to
speed the game along. Even when the puppet was not there to
hear, children refrained from tattling on her in both of these
situations. Their reluctance to tattle was expected in the
collaborative condition, as we know that adults often cover for
joint action partners [31–33]. However, it is somewhat surprising
in the individual condition.
There are several possible explanations for children’s reluctance
to tattle. A recent study by Ingram and Bering [44] has shown that
in free play situations, 3- and 4-year-olds tattle mainly on physical
aggression or property damage and less on conventional trans-
gressions of other children [41], [49]. Children in our studies,
however, were asked to tattle on a rule (i.e., conventional)
transgression, and importantly one from which they even
benefitted (allowing them to receive the game’s final reward
earlier than expected). They thus may not have been sufficiently
motivated to admit that cheating had occurred. Children might
also have refrained from tattling in order to protect the puppet, to
allow her to save face. In both conditions, they had played
alongside her for some time at this point and thus she was familiar
and probably likeable to children. Or children at this age might
already be sensitive to more general norms against tattling, and
refrained from implicating the puppet for this reason [34], [35]. It
is unlikely that they were simply afraid of getting in trouble when
admitting the cheating, since the majority of children admitted
that there had been cheating when the experimenter directly asked
them about this. Future research is needed to investigate under
what circumstances preschool children are likely to tattle on
another person’s misbehavior.
One might argue that perhaps children in the individual
condition understood the context of the game as competitive and
that this affected their behavior towards the puppet in the tests.
This is unlikely, however, because in her instructions the
experimenter emphasized that each player would receive a reward
at the end of the game, and the atmosphere and the puppet’s
behavior was friendly and non-competitive throughout. Further,
the finding that children in the individual condition were reluctant
to tattle on the puppet and even supported her to some extent
suggests that the puppet was at least familiar and likeable for most
children across conditions.
Most children participating in the current studies attended
daycares and/or had siblings. Given the low variability of these
factors in the samples, we could not analyze whether experiencing
regular social interaction with peers in everyday life affected
children’s behavior in the tests, for example, by them showing
enhanced socio-cognitive skills or more cooperative (or else
competitive) motivation [36], [49–52]. Future research may
examine more systematically whether and how living with siblings
or attending daycare affects children’s motivation and ability to
engage in cooperative activities.
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One open question that remains is how joint commitments
come about, and are sustained even in the face of perturbations to
the joint action, in young children (indeed, we do not even know
much about this in adults). One hypothesis is that children just
adhere to the agreement to act together, which ensures that any
event occurring in the course of the joint activity is treated under
the umbrella of this agreement until both partners explicitly
rescind the agreement and/or the joint goal is achieved. The
finding of a previous study supports this idea by showing that a
single initial agreement to play together may suffice for children to
feel like they have a joint commitment and to adapt their behavior
accordingly, even when players then played in parallel, that is,
individually [27]. Another hypothesis is that irrespective of
whether or not partners explicitly agreed to act together, a sense
of less explicit solidarity, ‘we-attitude’, or group membership
emerges in the course of acting together, ensuring that the partners
are ready to put more effort into the activity than they would if
acting alone or in parallel to each other [53]. This sense of
solidarity does not have to be processed on a conscious, cognitive
level but could be created by an affective rapport created on-the-
fly by the partners acting together, that is, on a less explicit,
affective level [54]. Because in our studies, children both agreed to
play together with the other and then played the game jointly with
her, we cannot tell which of these things caused children’s
behavior in the collaborative condition – and of course they are
not mutually exclusive. Future research should investigate this
question more systematically, along with the further open question
about when children (and adults) finally get fed up and stop being
generous to a partner who is acting in contradiction to an
established joint commitment and therefore finally withdraw from
the joint activity.
In summary, these findings support and extend previous
research by showing that 3-year-old children have a relatively
sophisticated understanding of some of the various rights and
obligations that joint commitments to act together entail. They
understand that some of the consequences of joint commitments
include supporting their partner through difficulties in the joint
activity, taking over the other’s role when necessary, and even
covering up for minor transgressions. Children thus seem to be
well on their way to an adult-like understanding of the elements of
joint activities.
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